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When It Comes to Business, the Right and Left Sides
of the Court Agree
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A.
Posner
ABSTRACT
Although the conservatives (all Republican appointees) on the
Roberts Court are more favorable to business than the liberals (all
Democratic appointees), the liberals are hardly anti-business. We
show that the four Democratic appointees serving on the Roberts
Court are far more business-friendly than Democratic appointees of
any other Court era. Even more surprising, the Democrats vote in
favor of business at significantly higher rates than Republican
appointees in all the other chief justice periods since 1946. Because
the current Democratic and Republican appointees support business
at record levels, the fraction of unanimous pro-business decisions-
the "Business Favorability Index"-has never been higher. What
with the left and right side of the bench favoring business at levels
unprecedented in the last 70 years, it is fair to continue to
characterize the Roberts Court as "pro-business."
. Epstein is the Ethan A.H. Shepley Distinguished University Professor at Washington
University in St. Louis. Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Law and
Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. Posner served on U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit and is a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. We are
grateful to Ha Eun Park for research assistance and to Jonathan Adler for very helpful
comments. Epstein thanks the National Science Foundation, Washington University School of
Law, and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, and Landes and Posner the law and
economics program at the University of Chicago, for research support. All data used in this
article are available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/researchibusinessSupCt.html.
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INTRODUCTION
In an article published in 2013,1 we identified several trends in the
Supreme Court's treatment of business during its 1946-2011 terms.
But one finding-that the Roberts Court was the most pro-business of
the five Chief Justice eras in our dataset-received the lion's share of
attention from scholars,2 the media, and politicians.
Professor Mark Tushnet noticed that reactions to our study (and to
others reaching a similar conclusion 5 ), divide along ideological lines:
I Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470-73 (2013).
2 E.g., MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 188
(2013); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1496 (2016); Stephen M. Feldman, The Interpretation of
Constitutional History, Or Charles Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller, 29 CONST. COMMENTARY
323, 339 (2014).
E.g., Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-
defining-this-supreme-court.html; James Surowiecki, Courting Business, NEW YORKER (Mar.
7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/07/antonin-scalias-corporate-
influence; Corporations and the Court, ECONOMIST (June 23, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/1 8866873); Noam Scheiber, As Americans Take Up Populism,
the Supreme Court Embraces Business, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/business/as-americans-take-up-populism-the-supreme-
court-embraces-business.html? r-0..
4 E.g., Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The Politicization
of the Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 195, 209 (2015);
Senator Elizabeth Warren, Speech to the American Constitution Society: The Corporate
Capture of the Federal Courts (June, 13, 2013)
(http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/ACSSpeechElizabethWarren.pdf); Press
Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Comm. Chairman, Judiciary Committee Look
At Impact of SCOTUS Decisions on Access to Justice, Corporate Accountability, (June 29,
2011) (https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-judiciary-committee-look-at-impact-of-
scotus-decisions-on-access-to-justice-corporate-accountability).
' Even before our study, commentators pointed to the Roberts Court's justices'
friendliness toward business. E.g., A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at
Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 80 (2013) ("One way of posing the question about the Court
and business is to ask how the United States Chamber of Commerce . . . fared . . . . The
Chamber took a position in nine cases, and it was on the winning side of every case . . . .");
Arthur Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation ofFederal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 302 (2013) ("[A]
backlash has set in against the private enforcement of public policies-a backlash that favors
corporate and governmental interests against the claims of individual citizens."); Corey
Ciochetti, The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business: The Significant Business Impact
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the critics tend to be conservatives or libertarians, 6 and the defenders,
left-of-center. "Liberals," according to Tushnet, "want to be able to
describe the Roberts Court as pro-business and conservatives want to
describe it as neutral." 7
of the 2011-2012 Supreme Court Term, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 385, 385 (2013) ("The
Court's opinions came out strongly on the side of business with business interests receiving
sixty-one out of seventy potential votes."); David L. Franklin, What Kind ofBusiness-Friendly
Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2009) ("[T]he Roberts Court is, broadly speaking, a business-
friendly Court."). One scholar even labeled the current Court "Supreme Court Inc." Jeffrey
Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html ("The Supreme Court term
that ended last June was, by all measures, exceptionally good for American business."). See
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Justice for Big Business, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/opinion/justice-for-big-business.html ("[T]he court ruled
in favor of big business and closed the courthouse doors to employees, consumers and small
businesses seeking remedy for serious injuries.").
Since publication of our study, scholars have provided further evidence of the pro-business
trend we observed. Ironically, many of their studies appear in a volume edited by Jonathan
Adler (one of our critics). BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT, (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016).
The volume contains 10 chapters, 7 of which provide confirmation, in part or in full, of the
Roberts Court's tendency to favor business (Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 10). See also Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 213 ("The Roberts Court's overall balance sheet in business cases fits the 'pro-
business' view of the Court reasonably well .... ); Adam Chandler, Cert-stage Amicus 'All
Stars': Where Are They Now?, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/cert-stage-amicus-all-stars-where-are-they-now/ ("Not
only did the Chamber once again file the most briefs, but it had the second-highest success rate
of the Sweet Sixteen."); Max N. Helveston, Judicial Deregulation of Consumer Markets, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2015) ("[A] strongly anti-consumer jurisprudence has taken
root."); Martin H. Malin, The Employment Decisions of the Supreme Court's 2012-13 Term, 29
ABA JOURNAL LAB. & EMP. L. 203, 228 (2014) (The Epstein, Landes, & Posner study found
that "the Roberts Court is significantly more pro-business" than its predecessors. "The Court's
decisions [in employment law] . . . are consistent with the study's finding.").
6 In Part II we respond to a, perhaps the, chief criticism of our 2013 study: that we treat
cases as fungible, failing to consider whether they are especially weighty or upset the status
quo. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Myth of a Pro-Business SCOTUS, HOOVER INSTITUTION
(July 9, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/research/myth-pro-business-scotus ("All cases are not
created equal . . . the counting of cases . . . gives no information about the relative importance
that the cases have in the long run . . . ."); Ramesh Ponnuru, More Misleading Attacks by
Elizabeth Warren, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2013, 2:32 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-09-16/more-misleading-attacks-by-elizabeth-
warren (counting "equal weight to every vote by a justice, even though decisions plainly vary in
importance for businesses . . ."); Jonathan H. Adler, Business and the Roberts Court Revisited
(Again), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/05/06/business-and-the-
roberts-court-revisited-again/. Adler repeats many of his criticisms in Jonathan H. Adler,
Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and Environmental Law, in BUSINESS AND THE
ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 287.
7 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 190. There are exceptions, though. See, e.g., Michael S.
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That makes sense-except that it does not apply to the current
Justices. Although the conservatives (all Republican appointees) on
the Roberts Court are more favorable to business than the liberals (all
Democratic appointees), the liberals are hardly anti-business. We
show that the four Democratic appointees serving Justices on the
Roberts Court are far more business-friendly than Democratic
appointees of any other Court era. Even more surprising, the
Democrats on the Roberts Court vote in favor of business at
significantly higher rates than Republican appointees in all the other
chief justice periods since 1946. Because the current Democratic and
Republican appointees support business at record levels, the fraction
of unanimous pro-business decisions-what we call the Business
Favorability Index-has never been higher.
We develop these and other results in Parts II and III of the
Article. Part I explains how we amended and extended the dataset we
used in our 2013 paper.
I. THE DATASET
For our 2013 article,8 we used the U.S. Supreme Court Database9
to create the Business Litigant Dataset (BLD). The BLD consisted of
all Supreme Court cases orally argued between the 1946 and 2011
terms in which business was either the petitioner or the respondent
but not both. We limited the parties opposing the business to
governments, employees, shareholders or other stakeholders, and
non-business organizations (such as unions or environmental
groups).10
Greve, formerly of the conservative American Enterprise Institute and now a Professor of Law
at George Mason University, who coauthored an article finding that the Roberts Court's
"preemption decisions supports the perception of a distinctly business-friendly Roberts Court-
but only up to a point . . . ." Michael S. Greve, et al., Preemption in the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts An Empirical Analysis, 23 S. CT. ECON. REv. 353, 358 (2015).
8 Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, et al., 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2016
Release 01, http://supremecourtdatabase.org.
10 We also built a second dataset, which consisted of 255 cases in which a business
entity was on both sides. On one side was a large business and on the other a small business. In
that dataset, we tested the hypothesis that conservatives tend to favor big business and liberals
tend to favor small business. To conserve space, this Article focuses only on cases with a
business on one side or the other.
36 [Vol. 54:33]
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Annual changes and corrections to the U.S. Supreme Court
Database, along with the improper exclusion and inclusion of
particular cases in our original dataset," prompted us to rebuild the
Business Litigant Dataset from scratch. (We should note that
replicating our earlier study with the revised BLD leads to no major
changes in the original results.) As in the original, the new BLD
begins with the 1946 term but now ends with the 2015 term. In all
other ways, the revised and extended BLD is the same as the dataset
we used in the original articlel 2-meaning that the new BLD has all
the advantages and disadvantages of the original. Falling in the latter
category is the omission of cases in which business is a named party.
Professor Adler suggests that excluding such cases may affect our
results, especially cases in environmental law.1 3 A deeper look at the
relevant data, however, suggests little cause for concern.14
In all, the BLD contains 1,866 cases for a total of 16,123 votes, or
about 25% of all orally cases (and votes) between the 1946 and 2015
terms.15 The sheer number of cases suggests that business has been a
major player in the Supreme Court for the last seven decades,
participating in nearly the same fraction of cases as the executive
branch whose outsized role, and importance, has been well
1 We included several cases involving organizations that we should have excluded.
Improper exclusions were cases in which a public utility or a bankrupt business (not person)
was a party.
1 For more details, including the problems with the BLD, see Epstein, Landes &
Posner, supra note 1.
" Adler, supra note 6. Adler reiterated his concern in an email to us (March 12, 2017;
on file with the authors).
14 The Supreme Court Database's natural resources-environmental protection issue code
(80130) retrieves 107 cases; 46 (43%) are in the BLD. For the remaining 61, we looked to see
how many were decided during each Chief Justice era, and whether the Court ruled for
("liberal") or against ("conservative") environmental protection. The results are as follows.
Vinson Court: I case, decided anti-environment; Warren Court: 6 cases, 33% anti-environment;
Burger Court: 28 cases, 60.7% anti-environment; Rehnquist Court: 16 cases, 62.5% anti-
environment; Roberts Court: 10 cases, 60% anti-environment.
These results show, on the one hand, that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are somewhat more
anti-environment than anti-business (see Table 1), while the Roberts Court is about the same.
On the other hand, the Ns are so small that they don't produce any meaningful change in the
interpretation of the results. Including the (excluded) environmental cases increases the Burger
Court's pro-business fraction from 0.426 to 0.434; the Rehnquist Court's from 0.440 to 0.448;
and decreases the Roberts Court's from 0.605 to 0.604.
15 For cases, 1,866/7,516-24.8%; for votes, 16,123/65,573=24.6%.
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documented. 16 (And recall that we do not include all business cases-
only those with business on one side or the other and with particular
opponents.)
II. GENERAL TRENDS IN THE COURT'S BUSINESS DECISIONS
Our earlier studyl 7 found that the Roberts Court was the most pro-
business of the five Chief Justice eras in the Business Litigant
Dataset; correcting and extending the data does not change that
conclusion, as Table 1 shows. Here, we report the fraction of all
decisions and votes (cols. 1 and 2) in favor of business by Chief
Justice era. We further break the cases into three subsets. "Closely
Divided" cases are those decided by a 5-4 vote except during the
seven "natural courts" (periods of stability in Court membership)
with 8 justices and the one natural court with only 7 justices. For an
8-person Court, closely divided cases are 5-3; for a 7-person Court,
they are 4-3. "NYT" are decisions covered on the front page or in the
business section of the New York Times on the day after the Court
handed them down. When the authority for the decision, as coded in
the Supreme Court Database, is "judicial review" at the federal, state,
or local level, we identify the case as "Constitutional."' 8
"Unanimous" decisions are those without a dissenting vote or
opinion. ("Closely Divided," "NYT," and "Constitutional" cases
allow us to explore trends in important decisions and partly respond
to critics that contend that we treated all cases as fungible;
"Unanimous" decisions are useful for considering the Court's overall
favorability toward business, as we show in the next section.)
Table 1. Fraction of Decisions and Votes in Favor of Business by
Chief Justice Era in the Business Litigant Dataset (BLD)
16 A dataset developed by Lee Epstein and Eric Posner shows that the executive branch
was the petitioner or respondent in 39.8% of the cases between the 1946-2015 terms. But the
percentage was only 33.3% during the Roberts Court era (2005-2015 terms). See Lee Epstein &
Eric Posner, Supreme Court Justices' Loyalty to the President, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2016).
7 Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
* To identify constitutional cases, we use the authorityDecision1 variable (=1 or 2) in
the Supreme Court Database.
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Chief Justiet All Cases in BLD Closely Divided NYT Constitutional Unanimous
(Terms) (Usually 54)
Decisios Vowtes Decision Votes Deration Votes Decisions Vos Deciions Votes
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
- (3)
Vinson Court 0.368 0.391 0.486 0.498 0.353 0393 0.315 0.384 0.286 0.292
(1946-52) (269) (2,303) (35) (315) (51) (440) (54) (469) (98) (837)
Warren Court 0.284 0.345 0.326 0.481 0.256 0.349 0.485 0.529 0.259 0.261
(1953-68) (532) (4,552) (43) (385) (129) (1,098) (66) (577) (216) (1,849)
Burger Court 0.426 0.430 0.487 0.500 0.409 0.399 0.455 0.459 0.333 0.335
(1969-85) (550) (4,726) (78) (698) (186) (1,593) (145) (1,259) (234) (1,995)
Rehnquist Court 0.440 0.439 0.545 0.505 0.426 0.459 0.511 0.489 0.345 0.345
(1986-04) (386) (3,418) (55) (495) (108) (954) (88) (783) (200) (1,762)
Roberts Court 0.605 0.575 0.600 0.514 0.735 0.620 0.769 0.670 0.612 0.612
(2005-15) (129) (1124) (20) (179) (34) (297) (13) (115) (67) (585)
Average 0.392 0.411 0.481 0.499 0.390 0.414 0.464 0.475 0.333 0.336
(Total) (1,866) (16,123 (231) (2,072) (508) (4,382) (366) (3,203) (815) (7,020)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the total number of cases or
votes in the Business Litigant Dataset.
Beginning with "All Cases," we note the secular increase in
support for business from the Warren Court to the Roberts Court,
regardless of whether the focus is on decisions (col. 1) or votes (col.
2). The Roberts Court is significantly more likely to reach decisions
or vote in favor of business than the Justices in the Vinson and
Warren Courts, of course, and even the Rehnquist and Burgers
Courts. In other words, the four additional terms of data confirm our
original conclusion about the Roberts Court's unique treatment of
business.19 (See also Appendix A, which uses regression analysis to
assess whether this conclusion holds when we add other relevant
variables. It does.)
The data in the "Closely Divided," "NYT, " and "Constitutional"
columns allow us to consider a criticism of our earlier study: that we
treated cases as fungible, failing to distinguish between important and
unimportant disputes.2 0 The critics say that although the Roberts
'9 We should also note that the Roberts Court has hardly "bucked" its pro-business trend
in recent terms, as some contend. E.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. High Court Bucks Pro-Business
Trend This Term, REUTERS (June 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-court-business-
idUSL2NOP61K320140625. The Roberts Court's justices' support for business in the last four
terms is greater than in the previous seven-from 55.3% in 2005-2011 to 70.5% in 2012-2015,
though the difference is not statistically significant.
20 See commentary cited in supra note 6. This is the same criticism that Cass R.
Sunstein, Moneyball for Judges: The Statistics of Judicial Behavior, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 8,
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/1 12683/moneyball-judges, leveled at the rankings
in our book, LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES (2013), and that we addressed by examining decisions in closely divided
cases and in cases reported in the New York Times [hereinafter NYTJ. Lee Epstein, William M.
40 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:33]
Court may be more favorable to business overall it has been less
friendly in weighty cases; and more supportive in cases with less at
stake for business or decisions that are "limited in scope." 2 1 Adler, for
example, points to Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting22 as "hardly
[an] outcome[] favored by business"; 2 3 and both he and Roderick
Hills claim that Massachusetts v. EPA24 and Wyeth v. Levine were
26
equally devastating. To them, victories in a few minor cases are far
less consequential for business than losing one blockbuster. 27
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Revisiting the Ideology Rankings of Supreme Court Justices, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. S295 (2015).
We take the same general approach here but refine both measures. In previous studies, we
defined "closely divided" as cases decided by a 5-4 vote (or 5-3 during the 1969 term when
only 8 justices served). It now occurs to us that this approach is too blunt. As we saw in 2016
after Scalia's death, short courts can occur, and in fact have occurred, in the middle of a term.
For this reason, we consider the size of the Court in determining whether a case was closely
divided using the procedure we outline in the text. The refinement we made to the NYT measure
is simple: Instead of including only front-page stories, as most political scientists do (see Lee
Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCl. 66, 75 (2000)), for
obvious reasons we add decisions covered in the business section of the NYT
2 Jonathan H. Adler, Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and Environmental Law, in
BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 289. A related criticism is that we do not
distinguish between "decisions that ratify the status quo and those that alter the law and upset
settled expectations." Jonathan H. Adler, Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and
Environmental Law, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 287. See also
Ponnuru, supra note 6; Stephen Richer, The Alleged Pro-Business Bias of the Supreme Court...
Sigh..., FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012, 2:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenricher/2012/10/15/the-alleged-pro-business-bias-of-the-
supreme-court-sigh/#2ceOa7el475c.
This is a variant of the criticism that our earlier study treated all decisions as fungible, and there
is a simple test to determine whether it has any merit. A large fraction of reversals when the
Court rules for business would indicate a change in the law, while a high fraction of affirmances
would suggest a ratification of the status quo, assuming lower courts follow Supreme Court
precedent (and there are many empirical studies suggesting they do. See, e.g., Chad Westerland,
et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI.
891, 896 (2010) (categorizing 10,244 U.S. Court of Appeals' citations to Supreme Court cases
as "Deviate," "Neutral," and "Comply" and finding that "Comply" was the modal category.)) It
turns out that the Roberts Court has the highest reversal fraction of all five eras when it rules for
business (73% versus 61% for all other eras), and the comparison between its fraction and the
others is statistically significant for all but the Burger Court.
22 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
23 Ponnuru, supra note 6.
2 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
25 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
26 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court, in BUSINESS AND
THE ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 195, 219. See also Adler, supra note 6.
27 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 199 makes the same point: "Businesses might win five or
ten minor cases but still come out behind if they lose one really important case. It's one thing to
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Maybe. But "expert judgment" is hardly foolproof. While
Ponnuru and Adler highlight Whiting and EPA as major defeats,
Tushnet's analysis suggests otherwise: that they weren't losses for
business after all. 28 Tushnet instead points to Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Co29 30 -Tire & Rubber Co,9 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 31 as those with higher stakes for business. To
Tushnet, these decisions "capture[] the Roberts Court's way of being
pro-business: the use of procedural rules that favor the big guys. The
conservatives shut down cases against big business; the liberals want
them to go forward."32 Then there's Wyeth, which Adler and others
deem a "significant business loss." 33 If So, why neglect PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing34 in which the Court reached the opposite conclusion on the
question of preemption (and in the process "re[wrote]"3 5 or ignored
"tension"36 with Wyeth).
Our point isn't to take sides in debates over the importance (or
lack thereof) of particular cases. It is rather to suggest that cherry-
picking by and disagreement among even knowledgeable
commentators only underscore a meta-analysis conducted by the
get the Court to say that Big Pharma doesn't have to pay its detailers overtime wages.. .but
something quite different when the Court upholds Obamacare." But unlike the critics, Tushnet's
analysis points to the success of business in the major cases. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 213.
28 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 204 ("But from a business point of view, losing the global
warming case in the Supreme Court was no more than a loss in a minor skirmish far away from
the larger battlefield.").
2 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
30 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
31 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
32 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 204. Other scholars have also noted that the Roberts (and
Rehnquist) Courts, interpreted federal rules in ways that "burdened plaintiffs while protecting
corporate and governmental defendants." Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the
General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1742 (2014).
" Adler, supra note 6. See also Martin J. Newhouse, Business Cases and the Roberts
Supreme Court, ENGAGE (DEC. 6, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/business-
cases-and-the-roberts-supreme-court.
3 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
3 Id. at 627 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) ("The Court strains to reach the opposite
conclusion. It invents new principles of pre-emption law out of thin air to justify its dilution of
the impossibility standard. It effectively rewrites our decision in Wyeth v. Levine .... ).
36 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court, in BUSINESS AND
THE ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 195, 220.
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clinical psychologist Paul Meehl more than six decades ago. Meehl
found that expert judgment is almost always inferior to systematic
scientific assessment; it may be even worse than novice evaluations.
Many subsequent studies have endorsed his conclusions.38
Following the lessons of Meehl et al., we opt for the more
systematic route assessing the importance of decisions by looking at
"Closely Divided" and "NYT" cases-two measures we've used in
earlier work (though with refinements here39). In response to a
suggestion by Professor Adler we also consider Constitutional
decisions. We do so with a touch of reluctance because social
scientists have yet to validate this as a measure of case importance (as
they have with the NYT measure, in particular). But Adler makes the
plausible claim that the outcomes in constitutional decisions are
probably longer-lasting and more entrenched than statutory decisions
because Congress can't overturn them by simple legislation. If the
commentators are correct, we should observe the Roberts Court
ruling for business less frequently in closely divided, NYT, and
constitutional decisions. But we do not.
Compared with the four other Court eras, the Roberts Justices
decide more-not less-often for business in closely divided
decisions, as cols. 3 and 4 of Table 1 show (except for the Warren
1 PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954). Meehl has been called "the most influential
clinical psychologist of the second half of the 20th century." Eric Jaffe, Paul Meehl: A Legend
of Clinical Psychological Science, ASS'N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. (July 8, 2013),
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/paul-meehl-a-legend-of-clinical-psychological-
science (quoting Scott 0. Lilenfield).
3 For a review relevant to law, see Gregory A. Caldeira, The Supreme Court
Forecasting Project: Prediction Versus Explanation and Statistical Models versus Expert
Judgments, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 777 (2004). Caldeira was commenting on a competition between
a statistical model and legal experts over predicting Supreme Court decisions. That the model
generally outperformed the experts hardly surprised Caldeira. Considering a long line of
literature demonstrating that "[h]uman judges are not merely worse than optimal regression
equations; they are worse than almost any regression equation," Caldeira would have been
astonished had the competition come out any other way. Id. at 778 (quoting RICHARD E.
NISBErr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 141 (1980)).
" In Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, we ranked the justices on these measures
but not Court eras. See also supra note 20 for the refinements we made to these measures for
this study. Almost needless to write, neither measure is perfect but so many scholars have
deemed the NYT, in particular, reliable and valid (see supra supra note 16 that it would be
against the interests of good social science to ignore it.
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Court, the differences are not statistically significant). As for the New
York Times measure, no Court supported business in more than 50%
of the decisions covered in the Times (cols. 5 and 6 of Table 1) until
the Roberts Court. Of its 34 decisions in the NYT category, 74% were
in favor of business, as were 62% of the 297 votes-significant
increases over each of the four previous eras. Although the numbers
are small, the story is similar for constitutional decisions. Relative to
the other eras and even to itself, the Roberts Court more often
supports business in these cases.
These results suggest that when the Roberts Court hears an
important case, it more often holds for business than did its
predecessors. But does the Roberts Court rule less frequently for
business in the weightier cases on its docket, as some commentators
maintain? Not really. When the Roberts Court found for business it
was less often by a 5-4 (or 5-3) vote but the difference is quite small
and statistically meaningless: 60% (col. 3 of Table 1) for closely
divided decisions versus 61% (col. I of Table 1) for all others. In
cases covered in the Times, the reverse pattern emerges: the Roberts
Court was more favorable toward business (74% versus 61%) but
again the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p = .07).
The gap is quite similar for constitutional decisions (77% versus
59%) but, again, not statistically significant.
Taken collectively the findings do not support the view that
business is losing high profile disputes and winning those of lesser
importance. More in line with our results is that the Roberts Court
tends to rule for business both the weighty and less weighty cases.
III. PRO-BUSINESS REPUBLICANS (AND DEMOCRATS) ON THE
ROBERTS COURT
What's driving these results? Why is the Roberts Court
significantly more favorable to business than its predecessors?
Ideology-or, more precisely, partisanship-is an obvious answer.
Justices appointed by Republican presidents are significantly more
likely to vote for business than Democratic appointees, as Table 2
shows; and Republicans have held a majority of seats on the Roberts
Court since Day 1. Just as Tushnet noticed that liberal commentators
like to claim that the Roberts Court is pro-business and conservatives
[2017] 43
Journal of Law & Policy
say otherwise, the Roberts justices too seem to express their attitudes
toward business in their votes. (Constitutional decisions in column 4
are the exception; only the Roberts justices show a substantial-
though not significant-gap in the expected direction. Without
further analysis, we are not quite sure why.)
Table 2. Fraction of Votes in Favor of Business, by Republican
and Democratic Appointees
All Cases Closely Divided NYT Consriutional
(2)
(1) (3) (4)
Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
Warren Court 0.326* 0.371 0.444 0.522 0.316* 0.390 0.519 0.541
(1953-1968 Terms) (2,609) (1,943) (207) (178) (614) (484) (335) (242)
Burger Court 0.391* 0.444 0.448 0.520 0.344* 0.419 0.506 0.440
(1969-1985 Terms) (1,298) (3,428) (194) (504) (416) (1,177) (332) (927)
Rehnquist Court (1986- 0.404 0.441 0.388* 0.536 0.437 0.465 0.500 0.486
2004 Terms) (705) (2,713) (103) (392) (199) (755) (158) (625)
Roberts Court 0.514* 0.607 0.230* 0.661 0.491* 0.697 0.605 0.701
(2005-2015 Terms) (391) (733) (61) (118) (112) (185) (38) (77)
Average 0.369* 0.441 0.412* 0.539 0.357* 0.447 0.514 0.479
(Total) (5,003) (8,817) (565) (1,192) (1,341) (2,601) (863) (1871)
Notes:
1. Dem.= votes of justices appointed by Democratic presidents;
Rep.= votes of justices appointed by Republican presidents.
2. We do not include the Vinson Court because all its members
were appointed by Democratic presidents.
3. Ns in parentheses are the total votes. *p < .01.
There are several problems, however, with this explanation. First,
Republican appointees have been in the majority since the 1969 term
and, in fact, they held more seats in earlier eras. Table 2 makes this
clear. During the Burger and Rehnquist years, Republican appointees
cast over 75% of the votes in the Business Litigant Dataset, compared
to 65% for the Roberts Court.
A second problem traces to the voting patterns of the four
Democratic (Clinton and Obama) appointees on the Roberts Court.
On the one hand, they are significantly less likely to support business
than the Roberts Republicans, as Table 2 shows. On the other, the
Clinton/Obama appointees are not only more pro-business than the
Democratic appointees of any other Court era; they also support
business significantly more often that the Republican appointees in
all other eras. (This is true of the Republicans on the Roberts Court
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too.) Looking at col. 1 of Table 2, the Democratic appointees on the
Roberts Court voted in favor of business in over 50% of the cases;
under none of the other chiefs did Republicans or Democrats favor
business at this rate. The same holds for cases covered in the Times
(col. 3). Only in closely divided cases were the Clinton-Obama
appointees at the very low end of support.
The upshot is that that contemporary commentary pointing to the
pro-business posture of the Republicans on the Roberts Court is
correct; they are more favorable than Republican appointees of all
other eras. What much of the commentary has missed (or ignored) is
that the Roberts Democrats are quite pro-business too.
Three pieces of additional evidence support this conclusion.
1. We ranked the 36 justices (from most to least supportive of
business) in all cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and in
four subsets: non-unanimous, closely divided, and NYT
decisions. (see Appendix B). In the "All Cases" category, six
of the Roberts Justices are in the top 10-including the two
Obama appointees, Kagan and Sotomayor.
The two Clinton appointees, Breyer and Ginsburg, are at #16
(44% of all votes in favor for business) and #21 (42% in favor)
respectively-some distance from the anti-business stalwarts
of earlier years (e.g., Warren at #33, casting 25% of his votes
in favor of business; Fortas ranked last at 19%); and Breyer's
and Ginsburg's support for business has only grown since the
2005 term. As a member of the Rehnquist Court, Breyer
favored business in 39% of the cases, which would have put
him neck-and-neck with Thurgood Marshall (#25). Between
2005 and 2015, Breyer's support jumped significantly (p < .05)
to 51%, which puts him in the top 10. Ginsburg's pattern is
much the same: from 38% support before the 2005 term to
47% support thereafter (but significant only atp < .10).40
40 A possible explanation for Ginsburg's and Breyer's increasing support for business
during the Roberts Court is that the Justices became more conservative in general not just in
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2. Underlying these results for the Democratic appointees is
the large fraction of unanimous decisions on the Roberts Court
that went business's way.41 Returning to Table 1 (columns 7
and 8), we see that when the Roberts Court speaks with one
voice, that voice favors business in over 60% of decisions.
Especially striking is the difference between the current Court
and its immediate predecessor. Even though both reached
unanimous decisions in roughly half their business cases,42 the
Roberts Court held for business nearly two times as often as
the Rehnquist Court (61% versus 35%, a statistically
significant difference). One factor that may temper the pro-
business inference of the Roberts Court is that it was less
active in the business area compared to other Chief Justices.
The percentage of business cases dropped steadily over the
five Chief Justice eras: 35.3% in the Vinson Court, 30% in the
Warren Court, 25.3% in the Burger Court, 20.9% in the
Rehnquist Court and 16.6% in the Roberts Court.4 3
3. The Court's tendency to favor business in unanimous
decisions has increased, not decreased, over time. In Figure 1,
we show the number of unanimous cases each term that were
business cases. The data do not support this hypothesis. The fraction of conservative votes for
Ginsburg and Breyer in cases outside the Business Litigant Dataset were roughly unchanged in
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts (0.381 and 0.377 for Ginsburg and 0.429 and 0.422 for
Breyer during the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, respectively).
41 The rankings of the Democratic appointees fall dramatically in non-unanimous and
closely divided cases. Kagan ranks #3, and Sotomayor #7 for all cases but #30 and #27
respectively for non-unanimous decisions (and Sotomayor is near the bottom too in closely
divided cases). See Appendix B.
42 51.8% and 51.9% for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts respectively. See supra
Table 1.
43 Overall, there were 9. 1% fewer business cases as a percent of all cases in the Roberts
Court than for the other Chief Justices combined and this difference was highly significant. The
fraction of business cases was also significantly lower when comparing the Roberts Court with
each of the other Chief Justice Courts (including the Rehnquist Court which was the next
lowest to the Roberts Court). Also note that the term "business cases" refers only to cases in the
Business Litigant Dataset and therefore exclude business versus business cases. See supra Table
1.
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in support of business as a fraction of the total number of cases
in the Business Litigant Dataset in that term or what we called
the Business Favorability Index (BFI). Across the 70 terms
there were 1866 cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, 815
were decided unanimously (43.7%) and 272 of these were
decided in favor of business. (33.4% of the 815 unanimous
decisions but only 14.6% of all cases in the Business Litigant
Dataset). But notice the variation over time. A linear
regression of the BFI on the term variable shows that the BFI
is flat during the Vinson years (1946-1952) and dips slightly
(though significantly so) during the Warren Court era (1953-
1968),44 dropping by about 0.6% with each passing term.
Unanimous support for business grows almost from the start of
the Burger Court. Regressing the BFI on the Burger Court
terms (1969-85) returns a positive and significant coefficient
showing an increase of about 1% over the course of this era.45
(The coefficient is also positive for the Rehnquist Court but not
46
significant. ) As Figure 1 suggests, the largest increase in the
BFI occurs over the course of the Roberts Court: over 3% per
term.47 Growth is especially noticeable (and secular) since the
2011 term: from 0.33 in 2011 to 0.50 by 2015.48
" A logistic regression of whether or not the case was a unanimous win for business on
term (with standard errors clustered on term) also shows a decline during the Warren years but
the coefficient on term is not significant at p < .05. See infra Fig. 1.
45 Logistic regressions produce the same results. See supra note 44.
4 Logistic regressions produce the same results. See supra note 44.
4 Logistic regressions produce the same results. See supra note 44.
4 Two contrary data points standout during the Roberts Court. There were 0 unanimous
cases in favor of business in 2008 and I in 2009. The number of unanimous cases in the
Business Litigant Dataset was also very small in those two years: 0 in 2008 and 6 in 2009.
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Figure 1. The Business Favorability Index, 1946-2015 Terms
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Notes:
The Business Favorability Index (BFI) is the fraction of all
decisions in the Business Litigant Dataset that were unanimous and in
support of business (Upb).
The solid circles represent the BFI each term; the solid line is a
loess line; and the grey band are the 95% confidence intervals.
IV. DISCUSSION
What with the left and right side of the bench favoring business at
levels unprecedented in the last 70 years, it is fair to characterize the
Roberts Court as "pro-business." But the question of why remains
unanswered. Lazarus suggests that the emergence of an "elite
Supreme Court" bar explains the "remarkable success recently
enjoyed by the business community in both obtaining [Supreme]
Court review and then in prevailing on the merits."49 Perhaps, but
49 Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters: Transforming the Court by Transforming the
Bar, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT, supra note 5, at 65, 66. See also Joan Biskupic et.
al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
.0
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there are other possibilities. One of us (Posner) has said that the
Roberts Court's support of business reflects broader trends:
"American society as a whole is more pro-business than it was before
Reagan."5 0
Posner's observation seems downright prescient considering uber-
businessman Donald Trump's victory in 2016. And Trump's victory,
in turn, may guarantee a "Supreme Court, Inc."5 for decades to
come.
report/scotus/.
'0 Liptak, supra note 3, at 6.
s1 Rosen, supra note 5, at 1.
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Appendix A. Multivariate (Logistic) Regressions
We present raw data in the text. To assess whether our findings
hold when we add other relevant variables, we estimated four logistic
regressions. In each the dependent variable is the vote of the justice
(for business=1 or against-0). And the chief independent variable of
interest in the eqs. in cols. 1-3, is Roberts Court, which indicates
whether the Roberts Court handed down the decision (=1) or not
(=0). Col. 1 uses all terms; col. 2 allows for a comparison between
the Burger/Rehnquist Courts versus the Roberts Court; and col. 3
between the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. In col. 4 the key
independent variable is Term because there we model only the
Roberts Court. A positive coefficient would indicate increasing pro-
business votes from the 2005 through 2015 terms.
Appointing President Party helps us to determine whether justices
appointed by Republican presidents are more likely to support
business. We expect a positive coefficient (Republicans=1 and
Democrats=O). To capture the Supreme Court's tendency to reverse
the lower court, we include Lower Court Pro-Business. Because 1= a
pro-business lower court decision (and 0=anti-business), the
coefficient should be negative. Finally, we include a series of
variables to indicate the federal government's involvement in the
litigation. If the federal government was the litigant opposing the
business, US Opposition (=1), we expect that business is less likely to
prevail. The same holds for US Amicus Opposition (=1), which
indicates whether the Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief
on behalf of the non-business litigant. For US Amicus Support (=1),
we expect the opposite: When the SG files in favor of business,
business should be more likely to win.
The results, displayed below, confirm these expectations. Most
relevant here are the coefficients on the Roberts Court. That they are
positive and significant suggests that justices' votes in the 2000-2015
terms are significantly more pro-business than in all other terms (col.
1), the Burger/Rehnquist terms (col. 2) and the Rehnquist terms (col.
3). For example, using the equation in col. 3 (and all else equal): The
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probability of a business-friendly vote during the Rehnquist Court is
0.43 (the 95% confidence interval is [0.40, 0.46]) ; during the Roberts
Court, it is 0.59 [0.54, 0.63]. Term shows that the odds of a pro-
business vote increased significantly with each passing term of the
Roberts Court; for example, the predicted probability is 0.65 [0.62,
0.68] for the 2011 term (the last in our original article) and is now
(2015 term) 0.79 [0.75, 0.82], all else equal.
Two other results are notable.
(1) Except for col. 1, Republican appointees are significantly
more likely to vote for business than Democratic
appointees. (Re-estimating the eq. in col. I without the
all-Democratic Vinson years yields a significant
coefficient on Appointing President Party.) Using eq. 2
(1969-2015 terms), the predicted probability of a
Republican appointee supporting business is 0.46 [0.44,
0.49]; the probability reduces to 0.41 [0.39, 0.42] for the
Democrats, all else equal.
(2) The U.S. government can steer the justices toward
supporting or opposing business-except during 2005-
2015 terms (col. 4). Though the amicus variables are
significant, US Opposition (as a party) is not. This fits
with other work reporting the Obama administration's
poor showing in the Roberts Court.52
52 Epstein & Posner, supra note 16, at 412.
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Variable All Terms 1969-2015 1986-2015 2005-2015
Terms Terms Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Roberts Court 0.642* 0.644* 0.629*
(6.31) (6.93) (7.84)
Term 0,174*
(10.29)
Appointing 0.179 0.222* 0.245* 0.696*
President Party (1.47) (3.49) (2.52) (5.69)
Lower Court Pro- -0.636* -0.587* -0.500* -1.022*
Business (7.85) (7.65) (6.74) (6.16)
US Opposition -0.464* -0.531* -0.449* -0.347
(5.83) (4.96) (6.10) (1.66)
US Amicus -0.749* -0.863* -0.798* -0.715*
Opposition (7.28) (7.32) (6.54) (4.48)
USAmicus Support 0.762* 0.580* 0.784* 1.121*
(7.24) (5.81) (5.92) (5.74)
N of Votes 16,009 9,162 4,462 1,062
N of Clusters 36 23 18 12
Notes:
1. Cells are logit coefficients (t-statistics are
*p <.01.
2. Standard errors clusters on Justice
in parentheses).
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Appendix B. Updated Rankings of the Justices, 1946-
2015 Terms
We ranked the 36 justices (from most to least supportive of
business) in all cases in the Business Litigant Dataset (1946-2015
terms), non-unanimous decisions, closely divided decisions (usually
5-4), and decisions covered on the front page or in the business
section of the New York Times on the day after the Court announced
them. Current justices are in bold.
Correlations between the subsets of cases for the raw fractions are
high (from 0.95 for All Cases/NYT to 0.66 for All Cases/Closely
Divided and Closely Divided/NYT); and the Spearman rank
correlations between each subset are significant (p < 0.01) (i.e., they
reject the null hypothesis of independence). But there are some clear
deviators-notably, Kagan and Sotomayor. Kagan ranks #3, and
Sotomayor #7 for all cases but #30 and #27 respectively for non-
unanimous decisions (and Sotomayor is near the bottom too in
closely divided cases). Although Sotomayor's and Kagan's Ns
remain small-and so we should be cautious in interpreting the
results-their overall rankings likely reflect the strong pro-business
bent of the Roberts Court, while their rankings in non-unanimous
decisions may provide a better indicator of their partisan/ideological
inclinations.
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All Cases Non-Unanimous Closely Divided New York 7imes
Alito 0.664 Jackson 0.719 Jackson 0.865 Alito 0.774
(122) (171) (37) (31)
Roberts Alist 0,712 Whittaker Roberts 0.676
0.622 (59) 0.846 (34)(127) (26)
Kagan Thomas 0.684 Alto Thomas 0.674
0.597 (171) 0.842 (89)(62) (19)
Jackson 0.571 Whittaker 0.676 Frankfurter 0.791 Jackson 0.580
(275) (111) (67) (50)
Thomas 0.566 Scalia 0.634 Roberts 0.750 Scalia 0.543
(355) (243) (20) (138)
Whittaker 0.553 Powell 0.629 Burton 0.729 Kennedy 0.535
(161) (267) (48) (129)
Sotomayor 0.519 Roberts 0.623 Harlan 0.694 Whittaker 0.529
(77) (61) (49) (34)
Scalia 0.515 Frankfurter 0.622 Powell 0.662 Kagan 0.522
(501) (320) (74) (23)
Kennedy 0.506 Harlan 0.616 Thomas 0.647 Frankfurter 0.520
(468) (310) (51) (102)
Powell 0.501 O'Connor 0.605 Stewart 0.643 Harlan 0.508
(469) (263) (84) (128)
Frankfurter 0.499 Kennedy 0.601 Scalia 0.622 Sotomayor 0.500
(517) (228) (74) (22)
O'Connor 0.476 Stewart 0.587 Kennedy 0.614 Powell 0.494
(546) (445) (70) (156)
Harlan 0.471 Burger 0.556 O'Connor 0.613 Stewart 0.488
(503) (315) _ (80) (215)
Stewart 0.471 Rehnquist 0.508 Vinson 0.600 Ginsburg 0.488
(720) (455) (35) (82)
Burger 0.463 Burton 0.498 Reed 0.585 O'Connor 0.481
(546) (261) (41) (158)
Breyer 0.444 Vinson 0.491 Burger 0.577 Breyer 0.479
(288) (167) (78) (73)
Rehnquist 0.431 Stevens 0.483 Rehnquist 0.524 Burger 0.457
(865) (410) (124) (184)
Stevens 0.425 Reed 0.470 White 0.504 Stevens 0.455
(788) (219) (117) (257)
Burton 0.421 Blacknun 0.463 Marshall 0.466 Vinson 0.451
(423) (406) (103) (51)
Vinson 0.418 White 0.444 Minton 0.462 Souter 0.447
(263) (538) (13) (76)
Ginsburg 0.417 Marshall 0.436 Blackmun 0.449 Burton 0.443
(319) (406) (107) (79)
Reed 0.405 Souter 0.432 Stevens 0.421 Rehnquist 0.415
(365) (146) (114) (270)
Blackmun 0.404 Douglas 0.421 Souter 0.395 Blackmun 0.385
(727) (570) (43) (239)
Souter 0.402 Goldberg 0.403 Brennan 0.390 Minton 0.382
(296) (62) (136) (34)
Marshall 0.387 Minton 0.394 Douglas 0.361 Marshall 0.351
(723) (132) (108) (242)
White 0.379 Breyer 0.392 Clark 0.300 Douglas 0.341
(971) 1 (130) (50) (205)
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Minton 0.364 Sotomayor 0.382 Ginsburg 0.277 White 0.341
(214) (34) (47) (311)
Douglas 0.360 Brennan 0.361 Breyer 0.273 Clark 0.331
(929) (634) (44) (127)
Goldberg 0.342 Ginsburg 0.356 Murphy 0.222 Goldberg 0.313
(111 (149) ( 2 (32)
Brennan 0.335 Kagan 0.333 Black 0.198 Brennan 0305
(1097) (27) (86) (334)
Clark 0.311 Clark 0.322 Rutledge 0.185 Reed 0.299
(582) (354) (27) (67)
Murphy 0.246 Warren 0.234 Sotomayor 0.167 Black 0.267
(130) (312) (12) (191)
Warren 0.245 Black 0.229 Warren 0.140 Rutledge 0.241
(526) (507) (43) (29)
Black 0.238 Murphy 0.221 Warren 0-225
(825) (77) (129)
Rutledge 0.235 Fortas 0.218 Murphy 0.172
(136) (55) (29)
Fortas 0.188 Rutledge 0.213 Fortas 0.156
(96) (80) (32)
Average 0.411 0.470 0.499 0.414
(Total) (16,123) (9,095) (2,072) (4,382)
Notes:
1. Ns are in parentheses.
2. We eliminated Goldberg, Fortas, and Kagan from the Closely
Divided column because each participated in fewer than 10
cases. But we include them in the column total.

